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REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Anheuser-Busch misstates the facts surrounding its service of alcohol to
plaintiff Michael Bee at its Bud World Party and its conduct in bringing him onto an ice
rink without a helmet or other protective gear, to participate in a hockey-puck shooting
contest. Mr. Bee fell and suffered serious brain, head, and neck injuries.
For example, Anheuser Busch states, "Plaintiff admitted that he had
consumed all but six (6) ounces of alcohol before even going to Bud World. (R. 245-46.)"
Anheuser-Busch also cites R. 245-46 for its allegation that "Plaintiff ignored instruction
to stand still and 'putt' the puck", and "[ijnstead, he took off down the ice and fell on his
head while taking a slap shot. (R. 245-46)." These are contrived and totally false
statements. See R. 245-46.
R 245-46 contains the "Statement of Relevant Facts" of Anheuser-Busch's
memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiff's punitive
damages claim. Rather than state what Anheuser-Busch has represented, Anheuser
Busch's "Statement of Relevant Facts" states as follows:
3.

Plaintiff continued to drink three to four 22-oz. cups of beer
while at the Bud World exhibit and claims he was drunk
throughout his visit at the event.. ..

6.

Plaintiff was invited to participate in a contest to shoot a hockey
puck towards a goal by event personnel and Plaintiff agreed to
participate....
Plaintiff slipped on the ice while swinging to shoot the puck,
lost his balance, and fell, cutting the back of his head. . . .

7.

R. 245-46.
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Anheuser-Busch's actual statements in the record comport more with the
court's findings in ruling on Anheuser-Busch's motion for summary judgment on
plaintiffs claim for punitive damages. Denying the motion for summary judgment, the
court, Judge Roth presiding, found as follows:
1.

AB supplied Plaintiff with approximately 90 oz. of alcohol on top of
what he had consumed before his arrival at the Bud World Party.

2.

AB had arranged the Bud World Party to promote its product and sell
it.

3.

AB had a higher reason to believe that people participating at the Bud
World Party would have been drinking, by the atmosphere and
intention AB had there.

4.

AB arranged the ice rink contest in the context of a drinking place,
where drinking was being promoted.

5.

Plaintiff was drunk or considerably intoxicated at the time, he had a
beer in hand, he had been reaching for a puck on the ice and
interacting with people running the contest.

6.

AB had reason to know Plaintiff had been drinking and was drunk
and had been acting rowdy.

7.

Plaintiff did not do anything in particular to cause the accident other
than what was expected of him, including to raise a hockey stick and
hit a puck.

8.

AB knew others were falling on the ice and that Plaintiff was
unsteady, but took no precautions to give Plaintiff a steady surface to
stand on or protective gear.

9.

Children participating in ice contests were put on carpet and given
helmets.

10.

AB knew or should have known that there was a high probability of
harm or danger to Plaintiff in the circumstances.

R. 2223, 1:6-3:3, R. 280-83, R. 731-749.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN VOIR DIRE
WAS PRESERVED FOR APPEAL
Anheuser-Busch attempts to distinguish this court's recent decision in
Alcazar v. University of Utah, 2008 UT App. 222, by arguing that plaintiff in the case at
bar did not preserve the trial court's failure to give voir dire to prospective jurors on tort
reform and negligence issues. The court in Alcazar reaffirmed its longstanding holding
that trial courts are obligated to elicit disclosure from prospective jurors during voir dire
about their exposure to tort reform propaganda and to negative reports about negligence
cases, as well as to inquire as to juror prejudices against negligence cases. Id. at ff 1114, 19. See, Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 102-104 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), Evans v.
Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 462, 467 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
Following Barrett and Evans, Alcazar held that plaintiffs in negligence cases are entitled
to such voir dire, "first, 'to allow counsel to uncover biases of individual jurors sufficient
to support a for-cause challenge' and second, 'to gather information enabling counsel to
intelligently use peremptory challenges.'" Alcazar at f 10. Plaintiff's requested voir
dire that was rejected by the trial court in the matter at bar was nearly identical to voir dire
approved by the court in Alcazar and its predecessors. Alcazar at f f 4, 14, Addendum 1.
The Utah Supreme Court set forth the rule governing preservation of an
issue for appeal, as follows:
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Generally, "in order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an
opportunity to rule on that issue." We have set forth three factors that
help determine whether the trial court had such an opportunity: "(1) the
issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be
specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence
or relevant legal authority. In short, a party may not claim to have
preserved an issue for appeal by "merely mentioning . . . an issue
without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority."
Ultimately, the preservation requirement "is based on the premise that
in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it."
Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 15, (footnotes omitted).
The record in the case at bar reveals that all three factors outlined by the
supreme court were met to preserve the issue of whether the trial court erred in not giving
voir dire on exposure to tort reform propaganda and negative reports of negligence cases,
as well as prejudice against negligence cases. First, the issue was raised in a timely
fashion, since it was raised before voir dire, when the court first addressed defendants'
objections to plaintiffs requested voir dire. R. 2226, 1:6-3:1. Second, the issue was
specifically raised. Plaintiff had submitted his requested voir dire well before the start of
trial to the court and defendants. RR. 1740-44. When the court addressed plaintiffs
requested voir dire on tort reform and negligence case prejudice, defendants objected and
argued that the questions were designed to "inflame" prospective jurors and were a waste
of time. R. 2226, 1:6-3:1. Plaintiff responded by explaining, in detail, why the questions
were proper and mandatory. Id. Thus, the issue was specifically raised.
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Third, plaintiff provided relevant, and, indeed, controlling legal authority to
the court. R. 1741, R. 2226, 1:6-3:1. Plaintiff gave the court full citations to the Ostler,
Evans, and Barrett decisions in support of the requested voir dire questions, and then
referenced the controlling Utah appellate court decisions while countering defendants'
arguments. Id. The court then ruled that it would not give plaintiff's requested voir dire,
but would ask one question to cover, to the court's satisfaction, plaintiff's voir dire
questions nos. 1 through 4. R. 2226, 1:6-3:1. All of this is clear from the following
dialogue:
THE COURT:
Okay. We'll go on the record with
case number 020910483. We're no[w] discussing the potential voir
dire questions and objections. And two, we're addressing the plaintiffs.
All right. You've objected to the questions one through four, and the
reasons were for the record, counsel?
MR. DALTON:
The reasons were that these type of
questions generate - are just intended to generate inflammatory
responses, Your Honor. I had this same experience just in my last trial
where they used these same questions. All the jurors don't like
lawsuits. They don't like high verdicts. When these questions were
last - asked at the last trial that I got at, we spent an inordinate amount
of time bringing people in that said, oh, the McDonald's case, or the
BMW case. And I think a reasonable question is, do you have a
problem with resolving disputes through lawsuits is okay. But when
you start trying to bait people to get, you know, the conservatives who
don't like big verdicts, then you're just going to get all kinds of
responses, and it's intended to just - to try to inflame people.
MR. RAT Y: Your Honor, these are taken right out of the
case law. Our appellate courts have recognized we live in a tort reform
society. The plaintiffs have an absolute right to know the exposure of
these potential jurors to the propaganda that's generated by these big
companies and insurance companies on these issues. And, you know,
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i UHM , .can;
:i.cdiLii }MH ami sa\. vou know, that would be
prejudicial error not to give these, Bui they arc right out o\ the case
law. Your Honor, and thiVre \er\ lair questions. | W)e have a need
ami a right to know \i we've got tort reformers on this jur\ We have
the right to intelligently exercise our peremptory challenges, and we
can't do that if wc don't know what their opinions are. We don't know
what they' ve been exposed to. These are all legitimate questions. I've
a!w ;JY<- had these given in my p;^ 1 n-i-.k ;UM\ tlv-\ Yr yen appropriate.
llil COl R i
I max reduce them down. I don't
know av I'm going to go into the detai! 1 think more of a general flavor
of some of these questions w ould be fine. I .ike - and like for example,
question three. Do ym personal!} believe that jury verdicts are
unreasonable'/ Well, (hat s so broad, at least to me. VVK; ^ n.rv
verdict? Mow a^u h s^uk-yr} v ^ k n o v ! -i^.L Ml

SUNSLN.

JLHW

^v^uii wan era!i one

question and THE COURT:

Yeah.

R. 2226, 1:6-3:1. •
1 lie » uuii II r. r\preyed "i«s imwillini'ue^. lu ask plaintiff s requested voir
dire, which, it apparently found too detailed and too broad. This, in spite of plaintiff's
citation and reference to controlling case law and plaintiff's warning of prejudicial error.
The trial court appeared to have a snnilai aliunde inwaid ilic i ase lav r. llie li al « ' I in
A h <; u

•«

».- ^'i . . -M ul counsel for Anheuser-Busch, the court

decided that instead of giving plaintiff's requested voir dire, it would cover matters with
one question of its own,
biiuvii , „ • . . . . .
biasvs I ruin

^K

- - *,.•»<

a

i

xr. lire to and

erntive reports of personal iniurx ca^es, was
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"presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court ha[d] an opportunity to rule
on that issue." Pratt f 15. The issue was preserved for appeal.
Nevertheless, Anheuser-Busch argues, as did defendant in Alcazar, that the
trial court did not so much reject plaintiffs voir dire, as it decided to ask plaintiffs
questions in a different way. See Alcazar <f 5 and defendant's brief pp. 13-14. AnheuserBusch argues that the voir dire asked by the trial court was sufficient to satisfy Utah
appellate court case requirements.
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that a trial court does not necessarily
have to accept the plaintiffs formulation of tort reform and negligence voir dire
questions, but if it rejects plaintiffs formulation, it is obligated to craft and ask questions
sufficient to reveal whether prospective jurors have been exposed to tort reform
propaganda and negative reports of negligence cases. Alcazar at f 14, Barrett at 101.
The trial court must then be prepared to follow up any positive responses with more
specific questions designed to probe prospective jurors' attitudes and possible biases
against negligence cases. Id. As the court said in Barrett,

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court should have asked the
prospective jurors appropriate preliminary questions-either those
suggested by appellant or alternative questions more to its liking
-designed to detect, initially, whether any of the propective jurors had
been exposed to tort reform and medical negligence propaganda. Had
the trial court done so, and had any of the jurors responded positively
to these initial questions, appellant would have been entitled to have
more specific questions put to the jurors designed to probe those
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jm^y's attitudes regarding, and possible bias resulting from, the tort •
reform information.
Barrett u. iL-:. ^emphasis added).
Anhueser-Busch sets forth three voir dire questions USKO . •

••

i

whicl 1 it claims vv ei e si lfficiei it to i i leet the reqi lirei nents of I Jtal 1 a • • Me • ase law.
i \, •,

;

-•.-•-

.• *t i, / jurors, family, or friends had previously made a personal

injury claim, whether they felt that any such claim was not properly resolved, and whether
prospective jurors believed thcyeouiii i^ ;<th aiui iniru, . , . . ..n. . *»M
buc. ,

. .... i..

a4

\ ..-,

• . * •'..• questions

*• it ten, and Evans were held by the court to be inadequate. . Mcaza* at

f 5, i:'\Y//Ls at 46~\ Barren at

i These questions do not reveal prospective juror

exposure to tort reform propaganda and to negative repc
1 ncM

i

* exiiil.iiif s

:

* i.. U^HI:UM , •

/.

\ alone subtle, biases

agau • a personal iniurv cases, iu. Ako, die court ui appeals has made clear th.it ''broad
questions concerning the prospective jurors' self-assessed ability to be fair au impartial"
do not suffice. Barrett iv
In fuel Hie v mi 4 In r »l llir trial courts in Alcazar, Barrett, and Evans, while
held to be inadequate, was actually more extensiu thai: \\K \oir dire performed by the
h'.y >.-.r,\ h-- the case at bar. Alcazai at'j[T H 18, £Y<7/?.v at 4(>_ -+<>.-. ,>.«\a/;...
exampk, m Alcazar, the voir dire lasu.. ,;j j ; • •
inter < - iews ; * itli eighteen men ibers of the \ renire panel. The trial court even asked
8

whether prospective jurors, close friends, or relatives were in favor or opposed to tort
reform. Alcazar at 114, 18. However, when a panel member asked, "What's tort
reform" the trial court cut-off any further discussion. Id. The court of appeals noted that
the trial court's approach did not, therefore, aid plaintiff's understanding of prospective
juror exposure to tort reform and medical negligence material. Id.
As inadequate as the voir dire was in Alcazar, it was more-so in the case at
bar. The court's total voir dire was less than one and one-half hours and included no
private interviews to follow up on responses made by the venire panel in court. Of
course, there was no mention about tort reform or whether the panel had watched, read, or
heard anything about personal injury cases, nor the other appropriate topics raised by
plaintiff's rejected voir dire. R. 2223 3:9-44:16, Addendum 1.
Anheuser-Busch asserts that the trial court had broad discretion over what
voir dir to give. That, however, is not the case on the voir dire at issue:
"We review challenges to the trial court's management of jury voir dire
under an abuse of discretion standard. Generally, the trial court is
afforded broad discretion in conducting voir dire, 'but that discretion
must be exercisedin favor ofallowing discovery of biases or prejudice
in prospective jurors." Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (quoting State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)) (other citations omitted).
Due to the strong interest in enabling parties "to elicit necessary
information for ferreting out bias," State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59,<p4,
992 P.2d 951, a trial court's discretion is most broad when it is
exercised with respect to questions that have no apparent link to any
potential bias. However, the trial judge's discretion narrows to the
extent that questions do have some possible link to possible biasy and
when proposed voir dire questions go directly to the existence of an
-9-

actual bias, that discretion disappears. The trial court must allow
such inquiries. Id. at ^43.
Depew v. Sullivan 2003 UT App. 152, 71 p. 3d 601, a t f l 11, 12. (emphasis added).
Anheuser-Busch also incorrectly argues that "[p]laintiff made clear in his
proposed voir dire questions that his voluminous tort reform and excess verdict questions
had to be asked in chambers." Anheuser-Busch's brief p. 11. First, the questions were
not voluminous, but fit on a single page. See Addendum 1. Second, following the
procedure recommended by the court of appeals, plaintiffs voir dire included threshold
question to be asked in court and follow-up questions to be asked in chambers if a
concerning response were given to the threshold questions. The questions were designed
to identify potential prejudice of any prospective juror while preventing such prejudice
from being communicated to the whole panel by inviting such a juror to express his
opinions in chambers. Again, the questions were either taken from or were approved by
the Evans, Barrett, and Alcazar cases.

The trial court had the right, and, having

rejected plaintiffs formulation of voir dire questions, clearly had the obligation to
properly inquire into prospective juror exposure to tort reform propaganda and negative
reports about negligence cases, and then follow up on the responses. The trial court failed
to fulfill its obligation. The court also would not permit the attorneys to ask any of their
own voir dire questions. R. 2223, 6:24-71.
Nevertheless, Anheuser-Busch repeatedly argues that the court "repeatedly"
gave plaintiff the opportunity to reassert its rejected voir dire questions and to assert
-10-

additional objections to the court's voir dire, but plaintiff failed to do so. See AnheuserBusch' s brief pp. 3, 5, 11-18. Defendant cites just two places in the record in support of
this contention of repeated opportunities, and manufactures its argument out of the fact
that the court turned off the record when it called counsel to side bar after completing its
voir dire. After the court asked all the questions it had, it stated:
THE COURT:
Thank you. Did counsel have any additional
questions they'd like the Court to consider? If so, let's approach the
bench if you would. Ladies and gentlemen, what we're doing is
counsel is going to come up here and give me some suggestions of some
additional questions that they would like me to consider to ask you.
We're going to go off the record and Fm going to turn off the record
for a moment. If you'll just be patient with us for a moment.
(Whereupon a sidebar was held - inaudible)
R. 2223,40:7-16.
Based on the above statement, Anheuser-Busch argues that plaintiff had the
opportunity to object again, and that he should have objected again and reasserted his tort
reform and negligence voir dire, but that plaintiff was "silent". This argument has no
merit. First, plaintiff appears "silent" because the court had turned off the record.
Second, the court asked for "any additional questions [counsel] would like the court to
consider." As the court had already rejected plaintiff's voir dire, plaintiff did not have
additional questions for the court to consider. As set forth above, under Pratt, the issue
of the court's error in rejecting plaintiff's voir dire on tort reform and negligence case
prejudice was preserved for appeal on the record. Anheuser-Busch's request that the
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court discard that and, instead, assume that plaintiff did not object again while the record
was turned off, should be rejected.
As Anheuser-Busch has attempted to take advantage of the record being
off, to represent to the court of appeals that plaintiff did not object again or reassert his
rejected voir dire, plaintiff states that, in fact, he did again express the need for his voir
dire, but this was again rejected by the court. Thereafter, the trial court only asked
additional questions requested by counsel for Anheuser-Busch, Mr. Christensen. R.
40:18-44:15. At the end of those questions for Mr. Christensen, we find the second
instance that Anheuser-Busch claims gave plaintiff an opportunity to reassert his voir
dire, but did not:
THE COURT:
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
THE COURT:

Thank you. All right. Anything else
counsel before we move forward?
No, Your Honor
All right. Fine.

R. 2223, 44:12-15.
Defendant argues from the above that plaintiffs counsel was again silent
when asked if there was "anything else." However, there was nothing else from plaintiff
since his voir dire had already been rejected. The court would not and did not ask
anything more requested by plaintiffs counsel. However, the real reason plaintiff did not
respond was because the court was only addressing Mr. Christensen, since it had only
asked Mr. Christensen's additional requested questions. Note that counsel for
Prominence, Mr. Dalton, also did not respond to the court's question.
-12-

In any event, the "spin" which Anheuser-Busch attempts to put on the
above dialogues and absence of dialogue is irrelevant, since the record does show that the
trial court had the opportunity to rule on whether to give voir dire to elicit prospective
jurors's exposure to tort reform propaganda and negative reports of negligence cases, and
to question prospective jurors so as to discover their prejudices against personal injury
cases. Indeed, the court was presented with controlling authority, and urged, in the
strongest of language, to follow the law and properly voir dire the panel. Unfortunately,
the court was persuaded by defense counsel not to do so.
Alcazar is controlling in the matter at bar. The voir dire rejected by the trial
court in Alcazar is nearly identical to the voir dire rejected by the trial court in the matter
at bar. See RR. 1740-1742 and Alcazar f 4. As noted by the court in Alcazar, this voir
dire was "'no less neutral or general than the preliminary questions required under the
voir dire framework outlined in Evans.'" Alcazar at <J[ 14. The court stated, "The trial
court simply left Plaintiffs' counsel without the necessary information needed to ferret out
a potential juror's actual bias or to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges, thus
prejudicing Plaintiffs." Id. at ^[18. The court then reversed the trial court's judgment and
remanded for a new trial, holding that "the trial court's error was prejudicial because the
trial court's refusal to ask Plaintiffs' counsel's voir dire questions or questions similar in
nature substantially impaired his ability to challenge jurors for cause or to exercise his
peremptory challenges." Id. at f 19.
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As in Alcazar, in the matter at bar the trial court left plaintiff's counsel
without the information needed to ferret out a potential juror's actual bias or to
intelligently exercise peremptory challenges, thus prejudicing plaintiff's case. As in
Alcazar, the court should reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for a new trial.
POINT II
THE DOCTRINE OF "PLAIN ERROR REVIEW" WOULD
ALSO APPLY.
Anheuser-Busch also argues that the "Plain Error Review" doctrine does
not apply to the case at bar. Under that doctrine, the appellate court may reverse the
lower court "on an issue not properly preserved for appeal", when a party can show (1) an
error exists, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is
harmful, v/z., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome . Pratt, at^[ 16.
While plaintiff has established that the issue of the trial court's voir dire
error was preserved for appeal, plaintiff notes that the issue would, in any event, be
reviewable under the plain error standard. First, the trial court erred, as set forth in Point
I, above. Second, the error should have been obvious, especially given plaintiffs citation
to authority, plaintiff's arguments, and the many and long-standing appellate court
precedents supporting the voir dire requested by plaintiff. In Alcazar, the court reached
its decision after noting its "prior, clear precedents." Alcazar at f 19. The court of
appeals also reminded trial courts in Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App. 152, 71 P.3d 601,
-14-

of the validity of the voir dire principles set forth in its prior holdings. Id. at ff 10-11.
The court also cited holdings of the supreme court reminding trial judges of these same
principles:
The Utah Supreme Court has instructed "trial judges to take care to
adequately and completely probe jurors on all possible issues of bias."
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798 (Utah 1991). The purpose for this
probing is to facilitate "both the detection of actual bias and the
collection of data to permit informed exercise of the peremptory
challenge." State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983) (citations
omitted). "All that is necessary for a voir dire question to be appropriate
is that it allow f[a party] to exercise his peremptory challenges more
intelligently.'" State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988)
(quoting State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984)). Accord
Saunders, 1999 UT 59 at^[34.
Depew, ztf 12.
Anheuser-Busch argues that "[t]he trial court clearly believed it was within
its broad discretion" in choosing not to inquire into prospective jurors' exposure to and
biases from tort reform propaganda and negative reports of negligence cases. However, if
that is truly what the trial court believed, then such belief was obviously erroneous, since,
as set forth above, Utah appellate courts have reiterated that trial courts have little or no
discretion when it comes to such inquiries. Depew v. Sullivan 2003 UT App. 152, 71 p.
3d601,atfflll, 12.
Third, the error committed by the trial court was, per se, harmful, as
previously held by this court. Rejecting the standard requirement that plaintiff show that
an absence of error would have resulted in a different outcome, Barrett held that in the
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context of voir dire questioning, prejudicial error is shown if the plaintiff's right to the
informed exercise of peremptory challenges has been substantially impaired:
An appellant claiming that the trial court's unreasonable limitation of
voir dire substantially impaired his ability to exercise peremptory
challenges simply cannot prove, in the traditional way, that prejudice
resulted from the error. Appellant cannot show with any certainty that
had certain questions been asked, particular responses would have been
received; that certain jurors would then have been challenged for cause
or peremptorily; and that particular, more favorably predisposed jurors
would have been seated instead, who would have deliberated to a
different result. Accordingly, in this context, we apply the test
enunciated in Hornsby: Prejudicial error is shown if the appellant's
right to the informed exercise of peremptory challenges has been
,r
substantially impaired." 758 P.2d at 933.
Barrett at 103. (emphasis added). Similarly, in Depew, the court determined the failure
to ask questions to elicit biases of prospective jurors was, of itself, prejudicial, and that no
showing of "actual prejudice" was required since there was no way for the plaintiff to
show any particular juror as biased or prejudiced. Depew, at H28-34.
Plaintiff presented the court with the controlling authority regarding his
requested voir dire, implored the trial court to follow the law, and warned of prejudicial
error. While the trial court's error was preserved, the issue is reviewable, in any event,
under the "Plain Error Review" doctrine.
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POINT III
THE INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE HAS NO APPLICATION.
Anheuser-Busch next argues that plaintiff invited the trial court to commit error
on voir dire and should be precluded from arguing the error on appeal. However, the invited
error doctrine has no application in the matter at bar. The Utah Supreme Court explained,
"Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that a party cannot
take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the
trial court into committing the error."
By precluding appellate review, "the doctrine furthers this principle by
'discouraging parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as
to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal."' Further, parties
are "not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the
benefit of objecting on appeal. Thus, "[e]ncouraging counsel to
actively participate in all proceedings and to raise any possible error at
the time of its occurrence fortifies our long-established policy that the
trial court should have the first opportunity to address a claim of error."
Pratt at f 17(citations omitted). The invited error doctrine usually requires an affirmative
representation to the trial court by the accused party, that he has no objection to the matter
at issue. Id. at f 18.
Anheuser-Busch asserts that plaintiff affirmatively represented no objection
to the trial court's voir dire and led the court into error by remaining "silent" when the
court asked if the parties had any additional questions for the court to consider. However,
as shown above, plaintiffs silence was no more than the court turning off the record.
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Furthermore, even assuming plaintiff made no further voir dire requests, the court had
only asked for "any additional questions", not ones that had already been rejected.
In reality, rather than invite error, as quoted above, plaintiff notified the
court of the controlling authority and plaintiffs absolute right to the voir dire. Plaintiff
implored the court to give the voir dire and warned of prejudicial error if the court chose
not to give it. Rather than plaintiff inviting error, defendants invited and persuaded the
court to err by arguing the voir dire was inflammatory and a waste of time, and that the
court could cover all the voir dire with one question crafted to its own liking.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY
GRANTING THE CO-DEFENDANTS TWICE THE NUMBER
OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES ALLOWED TO
PLAINTIFF.
The prejudice to plaintiff from the trial court's unwillingness to voir dire
prospective jurors on tort reform and negligence case bias was compounded by the trial
courts grant of six peremptory challenges to defendants. This, of itself, was prejudicial
error under Utah Supreme Court precedent, which requires reversal of the trial court's
judgment in the matter at bar and remand for a new trial. See, Carrier v. Pro-Tech
Restoration, 944 P.2d 346 (Utah 1997), Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993).
The court made clear that peremptory challenges are a powerful tool to shape the jury and
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improper award of additional challenges to one side are unfairly prejudicial. Carrier at
352.
Anheuser-Busch argues that its third-party claim asserting comparative fault
against Prominence and seeking reimbursement from Prominence of any damages
awarded to plaintiff from Anheurser-Busch constituted a "substantial controversy",
allowing the trial court discretion to award defendants additional peremptory challenges.
As explained in plaintiff's principal brief, and reiterated below, the Utah Supreme Court
made clear through Carrier and Randle that Anheuser-Busch's third-party action does not
constitute a "substantial controversy" that would allow for additional peremptory
challenges.
However, as also pointed out in plaintiff s principal brief, there is a more
obvious and ready basis for rejecting Anheuser-Busch's argument of "substantial
controversy": At the start of trial, Anheuser-Busch and Prominence stipulated to drop all
third-party claims from the lawsuit. R. 2223, 48:15-49:19, 51:11-54:9, RR. 2022-2028.
In fact, after stipulating to dismissal of the third-party claims, defendants insisted that the
court correct its initial statement to the jury panel that Anheuser-Busch was asserting that
Prominence was at fault, and the court obliged. R. 2223,51:11-54:9, 64:7-18, 20:17-21:3.
Anhesuer-Busch's dismissed third-party claims were not part of the trial in any way. Id.,
RR. 2022-2028. Anheuser-Busch has not shown and cannot show that it introduced any
evidence or made a single argument that Prominence was at fault, in breach of contract,
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or responsible to indemnify. None of these dismissed third-party claims were put on the
jury verdict form. RR. 2022-2028. Defendants stipulated to dismiss the third-party
claims so as to present a united defense asserting that plaintiff alone was at fault.
Yet, when plaintiff renewed his objection to defendants' additional
peremptory challenges, after defendants revealed to the court and plaintiff that they had
settled all claims between them, the court maintained its initial ruling allowing defendants
twice the number of peremptory challenges given to plaintiff. R. 2223, 44:21-48:14,
115:13-116:16.
Anheuser-Busch notes that even though the third-party claims of
nelgigence, breach of contract, and indemnification had been dismissed, plaintiffs claim
of negligence still existed against both Anheuser-Busch and Prominence. AnheuserBusch argues that a "substantial controversy" existed in that the jury still had to apportion
fault between defendants on plaintiffs claim. However, Anhesuer-Busch' s argument is
inapposite under Carrier and Randle. First, as demonstrated in plaintiffs principal brief,
fault apportionment, even when co-defendants blame each other, does not create a
"substantial controversy" that allows additional peremptory challenges. Carrier at 351,
Randle at 1333. Both Carrier and Randle limit a "substantial controversy" to a crossclaim against a co-party:
To avoid favoring one side of a lawsuit over another, a trial Judge
must carefully appraise the degree of adverseness among co-parties
and determine whether that adverseness truly warrants giving that
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side more challenges than the other. In our view, a "substantial
controversy" exists when a party on one side of a lawsuit has a crossclaim against a co-party that constitutes, in effect, a separate, distinct
lawsuit from the action existing between the plaintiffs and
defendants. When, however, a cross claim is merely derivative of
the original action, such as a cross-claim for indemnification or
contribution, a "substantial controversy" does not exist for the
purposes of Rule 47.
Randle at 1333, Carrier at 351-52.
In Randle, Randle, individually and on behalf of his children, sued Allen,
UDOT, and Salt Lake County for the wrongful death of his wife from a truck/car
collision. Randle at 1333. Allen cross-claimed against his co-defendants, UDOT and
Salt Lake County, for Allen's own injuries and damages from the collision. Id. The
supreme court held that it was prejudicial error to grant UDOT and Salt Lake County
separate peremptory challenges since they cross-claimed against each other and Allen
"only for the purpose of indemnification or contribution in the event they should be found
negligent." Id. However, the court noted that separate peremptory challenges for Allen
was appropriate, since his cross-claim for his own personal injuries against UDOT and
Salt Lake County constituted a "separate, distinct lawsuit from the action existing
between the plaintiffs and defendants. Id.
Anheuser-Busch and Prominence had no distinct, separate cross-claim, nor
any cross-claim at all. However, Anheuser-Busch attempts to distinguish Carrier and
Randle by arguing they did not involve "circumstances in which a non-derivative third-
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party complaint was filed to bring a third-party defendant into a lawsuit." This argument
is without merit. First, as noted above, Anheuser-Busch dismissed its third-party
complaint before the start of trial. Second, even had Anheuser-Busch not dismissed its
action, it did not file a "non-derivative third-party complaint." Indeed, "non-derivative
third-party complaint" is an oxymoron. Third-party complaints are, by nature and
definition, derivative of the initial suit filed. As set forth in Rule 14, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure,
(a) When defendant may bring in third party. At any time after
commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may
cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party
to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
plaintiffs claim against him.
Rule 14, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Anheuser-Busch's filing of its "Third-Party Complaint" was precisely the
derivative procedure set forth under Rule 14 for asserting a claim against another "who is
or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff s claim against him." After plaintiff
filed suit against Anheuser-Busch, Anheuser-Busch then moved the trial court for leave to
file a third-party action against Prominence on the ground that Prominence was liable to
Anheuser-Busch for part or all of plaintiffs claims against Anheuser-Busch. RR. 13-19.
The motion was granted and Anheuser-Busch filed its "Third-Party Complaint". RR. 3946. In its third-party complaint, Anheuser-Busch asserted that (1) Prominence was
comparatively at fault for plaintiffs injuries, (2) Prominence owed Anheuser-Busch
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indemnification for any damages awarded Plaintiff against Anheuser-Busch, and (3)
Prominence owed Anheuser-Busch for any damages awarded to Plaintiff against
Anheuser-Busch as a result of Prominence's breach of contract to provide professional
management of the Bud World Party and to provide liability insurance coverage for
Anheuser-Busch. Id. 40-46. Of course, all this was subsequently dismissed before the
start of trial, so there was no lawsuit between Anheuser-Busch and Prominence, let alone
a "separate, distinct lawsuit."
Nevertheless, Anheuser-Busch asserts a future, non-derivative breach of
contract claim against Prominence depending on the outcome of the case at bar. If
plaintiff understands correctly, Anheuser Busch argues that a substantial controversy
existed between it and Prominence in that Anheuser-Busch had an interest in showing
Prominence at fault for plaintiffs injuries, since that would improve a future lawsuit
against Prominence for breach of contract. This argument is both irrelevant and specious.
First, as described above and in plaintiff's principal brief, Carrier and
Randle look at whether there is a substantial controversy to be tried in the case then
before the court, not a theoretical future controversy. Second, even had Anheuser-Busch
any interest in making Prominence appear at fault for a future purpose, fault shifting does
not constitute a "substantial controversy" that would allow the trial court discretion to
award additional peremptory challenges. Carrier at 351, Randle at 1333. Third, plaintiff
notes that if Anheuser-Busch were positioning for damages in a future breach of contract
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claim against Prominence, then its interest would be in making itself appear at fault and
having damages awarded against it, rather than against Prominence. Damages awarded to
plaintiff against Prominence would not be recoverable by Anheuser-Busch in a later
breach of contract action. Fourth, plaintiff notes again that Anheuser-Busch and
Prominence had dismissed their third-party action and their only defense at trial was that
plaintiff was at fault for his own injuries.
Finally, Georgia Ports Authority v. Harris, 243 Ga.App. 508, 533 S.E.2d
404 (Ga.App. 2000) is irrelevant to the matter at bar. There, defendant Georgia Ports
Authority appealed the equal allocation of defense peremptory challenges between it and
plaintiff's employer, a third-party defendant. Id. at 512. Based on Georgia statutory law
and facts unique to the case, the court found no abuse of discretion in the way the
peremptory challenges were allocated between the defendants. Id.
The record establishes, incontrovertibly, that there was no "substantial
controversy" between the co-defendants, as that term has been defined by the Utah
Supreme Court, that would allow the trial court to grant separate sets of peremptory
challenges to the defendants. The trial court committed prejudicial error by giving
defendants twice the number of peremptory challenges given to plaintiff. For this
independent reason, the court should reverse the judgement of the trial court and remand
for a new trial.

-24-

CONCLUSION
The court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case
for a new trial, since the trial court committed prejudicial errors in rejecting plaintiffs
voir dire, requested to discover prospective juror exposure to negative reports of personal
injury cases and prejudice against such cases. The trial court also committed prejudicial
error in granting co-defendants six peremptory challenges, although there was no
"substantial controversy" that would allow the trial court to allocate additional challenges.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff Michael Bee respectfully requests that the Utah
Court of Appeals reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new
trial.
DATED AND SUBMITTED this 29th day of August, 2008.

Matthew H. Raty
Cory B Mattson
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Addendum 1:

Plaintiffs Requested Voir Dire Nos. 1-4. RR. 1740-1744.

Tabl

Question No. 1.
Do you believe a lawsuit is a proper
method of resolving disputes concerning compensation for personal
injuries? Ostler v. Albina Transfer Company, Inc., 781 P.2d 445
(Utah 1989). Please explain [in chambers].
Question No. 2.
Have any of you watched, read, or heard
anything that suggests a "lawsuit crisis" or the need for ,ftort
reform"? Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1993);
Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). Please explain [in
chambers].
a.
b.
c.

Do you think the article, program, etc. made some
good points?
Did you agree with the points made? Please explain
[in chambers].
Would you be inclined to reduce the damage award, if
any, in this case, because of what you have watched,
read or heard? Please explain [in chambers].

Question No. 3.
Have any of you watched, read or heard
anything which suggests that jury verdicts are too high or
unreasonable? What have you seen, heard or read? (To be asked of
jurors in chambers.)
a.
b.

Do you personally believe that jury verdicts are
unreasonable?
Do you believe that monetary limits should be placed
upon the amounts which a jury can award to an
individual who sues for personal injuries?

Question No. 4.
Would you be hesitant to award
compensation for any of the following elements of damages,
provided you first find that the plaintiff sustained his burden of proof
to be entitled to damages:
a.
b.
c.
d.
RR. 1740-1742.

Past medical expenses?
Past lost wages?
Pain and suffering, including loss of enjoyment of life?
Punitive damages to punish a wrong-doer?

